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ABSTRACT: Experimental weak + vacuum protocol has been demonstrated using commercial 
QKD system based on a standard bi-directional ‘Plug & Play’ set-up. By making simple 
modifications to a commercial quantum key distribution system, decoy state QKD allows us to 
achieve much better performance than QKD system without decoy state in terms of key 
generation rate and distance. We demonstrate an unconditionally secure key rate of 6.2931 x 10-4
 
 
per pulse for a 25 km fiber length. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has drawn many attentions from scientists. Different 
from the classical cryptography, quantum key distribution (QKD) [1-3] can help two 
remote parties to set up the secure key by non-cloning theorem [4]. Further, proofs for the 
unconditional security over noisy channel have been given [5-8]. Unfortunately, in view of 
implementation, “perfect” devices are always very hard to build. Therefore most up-to-
date QKD systems substitute the desired perfect single photon sources by heavily 
attenuated coherent laser sources. QKD can be performed with these laser sources over 
more than 120 km of telecom fibers [9, 10]. 
 
However, this substitution raises some severe security concern. The output of coherent 
laser source obeys Poisson distribution. Thus the occasional production of multi-photon 
signals is inevitable no matter how heavily people attenuate the laser. Recall that the 
security of BB84 protocol [3] is guaranteed by quantum non-cloning theorem, the 
production of multi-photon signals is fatal for the security: the eavesdropper (normally 
denoted by Eve) can simply keep an identical copy of what Bob possesses by blocking all 
single-photon signals and splitting all multi-photon signals. Most up-to-date QKD 
experiments have not taken this photon-number splitting (PNS) attack into account, and 
thus are, in principle, insecure. 
 
Hwang [11] proposed the decoy state method as an important weapon to combat those 
sophisticated attack: by preparing and testing the transmission properties of some decoy 
states, Alice and Bob are in a much better position to catch an eavesdropper. Hwang 
IIUM Engineering Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2009 Ali et al. 
 82 
specifically proposed to use a decoy state with an average number of photon of order 1. 
Hwang’s idea was highly innovative. 
 
Decoy pulse QKD theory gives a rigorous bound of the characteristics of the single 
photon pulses, which are the only source pulses that contribute to the secure bit rate. In 
[14], combining the idea of security proofs using the entanglement distillation approach in 
GLLP [10] with decoy method; they gave a formula for the key generation rate  
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Where q depends on the protocol, the subscript  μ is the average photon number per 
signal in signal states, Qμ is the gain of signal states, Eμ is the quantum bit error rate 
(QBER) of signal states, Q1  is the gain of the single photon states in signal states, e1  is the 
error rate of single photon states. f(x) is the bi-directional error correction rate [13], and 
H2(x) is binary Shannon information function: 
 
H2(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x).                   (2) 
 
Our implementation is based on BB84 [3] protocol. Among total N pulses sent in 
experiment, NS pulses are used as signal states. Therefore the factor q is given by q = ½ 
NS/N . 
 
Qμ  and Eμ  can be measured directly from experiments. In [12], they have proposed a 
practical protocol with Weak + Vacuum states with average photon number 0 and v. such 
a protocol is relatively simple to implement. The gain of the weak decoy state Qv and its 
error rate  Eμ   could also be required directly from experiments. Considering statistical 
fluctuations, the lower bounds of  Q1 , and the upper bound of e1  
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In this paper, we will present the experimental implementation of weak decoy + 
vacuum states QKD using commercial QKD systems are bi-directional. To show 
conceptually how simple it is to apply the weak decoy + vacuum state idea to a 
commercial QKD system, we chose ID-3000 commercial Quantum Key Distribution 
system manufactured by id Quantique. To implement the one decoy state protocol, we 
have to add some new optical and electronics components to id Quantique and have to 
attenuate each signal to the intensity of either signal state or weak decoy or vacuum state 
randomly. In our implementation, the attenuation will be done by placing a VOA (variable 
optical attenuator) in Alice’s side. Specifically, our QKD system requires the polarizations 
of the two pulses from the same signal to be orthogonal. Therefore the VOA must be 
polarization independent so as to attenuate the two pulses equally. The VOA utilized in 
our experiment to attenuate signals dynamically is Acousto-Optic Modulator (AOM).  
 
 
2.   EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
 
Existing commercial QKD systems are bi-directional. To show conceptually how 
simple it is to apply the decoy state idea to a commercial QKD system, we chose ID-3000 
commercial Quantum Key Distribution system manufactured by id Quantique.  
 
The prototype of this QKD system is described in section 2 of [8]. Here we describe it 
briefly: a frame of NP pulses (in our experiment, NP = 624) is generated from Bob and 
sent to Alice. Within a frame, the time interval between signals is 200 ns. The next frame 
will not be generated until the whole frame has returned to Bob. The long delay line inside 
Jr. Alice promises that the incoming signal and returning signal will not overlap in the 
channel between Bob and Jr. Alice so as to avoid Rayleigh Scattering. 
 
This QKD system is called p&p auto-compensating set-up, where the key is encoded in 
the phase between two pulses traveling from Bob to Alice and back (see Fig. 1) . A strong 
laser pulse (@ 1550 nm) emitted at Bob is separated at a first 50/50 beam splitter (BS), 
after having traveled through a short arm and a long arm, including a phase modulator 
(PMb) and a 50 ns delay line (DL), respectively. All fibers and optical elements at Bob are 
polarization maintaining. The linear polarization is turned by 90 degree in the short arm, 
therefore the two pulses exit Bob’s step-up by the same port of the PBS. The pulses travel 
down to Alice, are reflected on a Faraday mirror, attenuated and come back orthogonally 
polarized. In turn, both pulses now take the other path at Bob and arrive at the same time 
at BS where they interfere. Then, they are detected either in D1, or after passing through 
the circulator (C) in D2. Since the two pulses take the same path, inside Bob in reversed 
other, this interferometer is auto-compensated.  
 
The implementation of weak + vacuum protocol requires amplitude modulation of three 
levels: μ, v and 0. Note that it would be quite hard for high-speed amplitude modulators to 
prepare the real ‘vacuum ‘state due to finite distinction ratio. However, if the gain of the 
‘vacuum’ state is very close (like within a few standard deviations) to the dark count rate, 
it would be a good approximation. In our implementation, the attenuation is done by 
placing a VOA (variable optical attenuator) in Alice’s side. Figure 1 illustrates the 
schematic of the optical and electric layouts in our system. The commercial QKD system 
by id Quantique consists of Bob and “Jr. Alice”. In our decoy state experiment, the actual 
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(sender’s) system is called “Alice”. It consists of “Jr. Alice” and four new optical and 
electronics components added by us. More concretely, for our decoy state protocol, we 
place the Decoy Acousto Optic Modulator AOM (denoted by DA in Fig. 1) right in front 
of Jr. Alice. Its “idle state” is set to maximum transmittance. When the frame comes from 
Bob, the Decoy AOM is in the idle state. After the first pulse reaches coupler C2, it will be 
detected by the classical detector and a synchronization signal will be output to trigger the 
Decoy Generator. The Decoy Generator (DG in Fig. 1), being triggered, will hold a delay 
time td before outputting NP modulation voltages driving the Decoy AOM to attenuate the 
intensity of each the NP signals to be either that of signal state or decoy state dynamically, 
according to the Decoy Profile. The compensating AOM (CA) is used only for the purpose 
of shifting the frequency of the signal and, thus maintaining the alignment between Alice’s 
and Bob’s interferometers. A compensating generator (CG) is used to drive the 
compensating AOM (CG).] 
 
 
Fig.1: Experimental setup of Weak-Vacuum State Protocol. 
 
 
3.   RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
      
After the transmission of all the signals, Alice broadcasted to Bob the distribution of 
decoy states as well as basis information. Bob then announced which signals he had 
actually received in correct basis. We assume Alice and Bob announced the measurement 
outcomes of all decoy states as well as a subset of the signal states. From those 
experimental data, Alice and Bob then determined Qμ, Qv, Eμ, and Ev , whose values are 
now listed in Table 1. Note that our experiment is based on BB84 [10] protocol, thus q = 
(½)NSμ /N, where NSμ is the number of pulses used as signal state when Alice and Bob 
choose the same basis, and N = 105 Mbit is the total number of pulses sent by Alice in this 
experiment. We performed numerical simulation to find out the optimal parameters. 
According to simulation results, we choose the intensities as μ = 0.55, v = 0.152. Numbers 
of pulses used as signal state, weak decoy state and vacuum state are Nμ = 0.635 N, Nv = 
0.203 N, and N0 = 0.162 N, respectively, where N = 105 Mbit is the total data size we 
used. In our analysis of experimental data, we estimated e1 and Q1
10uα =
 very conservatively as 
within 10 standard deviations (i.e., ), which promises a confidence interval for 
statistical fluctuations of 1 − 1.5 x 10-23
The experimental results listed in Table 1 are the input for Eqs (1), (3), (4), whose 
output is a lower bound of the key generation rate, as shown in Table 2. Even with our 
very conservative estimation of e
. 
 
1 and Q1, we got a lower bound for the key generation 
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rate RL = 6.2931 x 10-4 
Para.       Value 
per pulse, which means a final key length of about L = NR = 66 
kbit.  
 
Table 1: Direct results from our experiment. 
 
Para.     Value Para.       Value 
 
Qµ       0.0094 
Qν       0.0027 
Eµ        0.0107 
Eν         0.0221 
q              0.319 
f (E) [13] 1.22 
 
 
Table 2: The lower bounds of Q1, R and the upper bound of e1
Para.             Value                            
.  
 
Para.            Value                                  
1
LQ                0.0037 
1
Ue                 0.0271 
LR            6.2931x 10-4 
The values are calculated from Eqs. (1), (3), and (4), taking  
statistical fluctuation into account. 
 
 
4.   CONCLUSION  
 
Experimental weak + vacuum decoy QKD system using commercial QKD system has 
been demonstrated over a 25 km fiber with an unconditionally secure key rate of 6.2931 x 
10-4. It is unconditionally secure against all types of attacks, including the PNS attack. We 
conclude that decoy pulses improve the security and performance of weak pulse QKD. 
However, sources and detectors must be calibrated accurately to avoid any artifacts that 
may compromise security.  
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